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FRED AHLERT MUSIC CORP. v. WARNER/CHAPPELL MUSIC,
/NC. - POST-TERMINATION LICENSING OF PRE-
TERMINATION DERIVATIVE WORKS:
WHOSE SONG IS IT ANYWAY?
I. INTRODUCTION
The principle that one's writings and inventions should be se-
cured and protected from exploitation is a cornerstone of our legal
system.1 Copyright laws, in particular, support this principle in sev-
eral key ways. The copyright laws enable authors to obtain exclu-
sive rights to their works, and they also provide a uniform system of
enforcement to protect these rights, thereby promoting further
writing and scholarship. 2
In addition to conferring exclusive ownership rights, however,
copyright laws also prescribe the terms under which the public
gains access to a copyright holder's creative works. 3 It is Congress'
responsibility, in enacting laws, to strike a balance between the
rights of copyright holders and society's equally compelling interest
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause empowers Congress "[t]o pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries." Id.
2. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1976) [hereinafter
House Report]. In reference to copyrights, the Report states that "[o] ne of the
fundamental purposes behind the copyright clause of the Constitution ... was to
promote national uniformity and to avoid the practical difficulties of determining
and enforcing an author's rights under the differing laws and in the separate
courts of the various States." Id.
3. See Virginia E. Lohmann, Note, The Errant Evolution of Termination of Trans-
rl Pdghts and 6te nrvative Ex1__L on 48_ AO SN.--.QT T 97 QOQ 7I ) (quo
ing United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131,158 (1948)). See also I WILLIAM
F. PATRY, COPmRGHT LAw AND PRACGMCE 24 (1994) [hereinafter Patry]. Patry rea-
sons that the public interest is also served when authors obtain exclusive rights to
their works. See id. He notes that "the Founding Fathers believed private property,
including intellectual property, was the best way to ensure the triumph of democ-
racy over the tyranny of the aristocracy." Id.
(379)
1
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in ensuring the free flow of ideas. 4 The courts' primary task is to
maintain this balance when interpreting federal copyright laws.5
In Fred Ahert Music Corporation v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc.,6
both parties claimed the right to license and receive royalties from
a 1969 Joe Cocker recording used on the movie soundtrack and
soundtrack album of the motion picture "Sleepless in Seattle."1
7
The Cocker recording is a derivative work based on the original
copyrighted musical composition "Bye Bye Blackbird" (the
"Song") 
.8
The controversy stems from the changes Congress introduced
into copyright law with the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976
("the Act"). 9 Specifically, the Act has made it difficult to determine
whether the author or the publisher has the authority to license
4. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429
(1984). Justice Stevens wrote:
As the text of the Constitution makes plain, it is Congress that has been
assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that
should be granted to authors or to inventors in order to give the public
appropriate access to their work product. ... [TIhis task involves a diffi-
cult balance between the interests of authors and inventors in the control
and exploitation of theif-writings and discoveries on the one hand, and
society's competing interest in the free flow of ideas, information, and
commerce on the other hand.
Id.
5. See Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir.
1992) ("[T] he copyright law seeks to establish a delicate equilibrium.... In apply-
ing the federal act to new types of cases, courts must always keep this symmetry in
mind."); see alsoJessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72
CoRmNLL L. REV. 857, 903-04 (1987). Litman notes that Congress encouraged ne-
gotiations between various interests groups, which eventually resulted in substan-
tive compromises that made the revised copyright legislation possible. See id. at
903. Litman recognizes that " [t]he legislative process may have struck an unwise
balance," but believes that it was "also a balance around which the represented
industries have since structured their relationships." Id. Litman concludes that, in
order to maintain this balance, courts must view the statute's provisions in the
context of the negotiations leading to their enactment. See id. at 904.
6. 155 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1998).
7. See id.
8. See id. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines "derivative work" as:
[A] work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a transla-
tion, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion pic-
ture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgement,
condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, trans-
formed, or adapted. A work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations,
elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent an origi-
nal work of authorship, is a derivative work.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
9. See 17 U.S.C. § 304 (1994).
[Vol. 6: p. 379
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new uses of a derivative work prepared prior to a statutory termina-
tion of a copyright grant.10
This Note focuses on the difficulties presented by this complex
issue. First, Part II details the facts of the Ahiert case.'1 Next, Part
III outlines the changes in copyright law resulting from the Act, as
well as how subsequent case law reflects these changes.1 2 Part IV of
this Note traces the Second Circuit's attempt to construe this novel
issue within the confines of emerging case law.13 Finally, Part V
discusses the effect of the court's holding on the licensing of deriva-
tive works following a statutory termination. 14
II. FACTS
The Song was written by Mort Dixon and Ray Henderson, who
registered their copyright on May 3, 1926.15 The copyright was
scheduled to expire in December 1982, but was renewed by the au-
thors on May 6, 1953.16 After the renewal, each author assigned his
interest in the copyright to Remick Music Corporation, the prede-
cessor in interest to Warner.1 7 Dixon died in March 1956.18
In May 1969, Warner granted a nonexclusive mechanical li-
cense1 9 to A & M records ("A & M") to record and manufacture a
10. Section 304(c)(6)(A) of the Act provides that an authorized derivative
work prepared before a copyright grant was terminated can continue to be used
after termination. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (6) (A) (1994). However, while the excep-
tion specifically prohibits the creation of new derivative works, it does not address
the issue of new uses of derivative works. See id; see also Paul Goldstein, Derivative
Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPYMGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 209 (1983)
("[t]he language of the derivative works exception leaves many important ques-
tions unanswered").
11. For a full discussion of the facts and procedural history of this case, see
infra notes 15-39 and accompanying text.
12. For an overview of the legislative history and statutory background of the
1976 Copyright Act, see infra notes 40-77 and accompanying text; see infra notes 78-
99 for a discussion of judicial interpretation of the Act.
13. For a comprehensive discussion of the court's reasoning in Ahlert, see infra
notes 100-157 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the impact of the court's decision on both authors'
and publishers' rights, see infra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
15. See Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 155 F.3d 17,
19 (2d Cir. 1998).
16. See id. For a discussion of the copyright renewal provisions, see infra note
59 and accompanying text.
17. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 19. For a discussion of the effect of transferring
copyright interests, see infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
18. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 19.
19. See Fred Ahlert Music v. Warner/Chappell Music, 958 F. Supp. 170, 171
n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). The district court defined a mechanical license as a grant to
use a copyrighted work in the manufacture and distribution of phonorecords. See
id.; see also Vincent D. Paragano, Making Money from the Airwaves: The Basics of Music
3
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phonorecording of the Song performed by Joe Cocker.20 The
terms limited the agreement as "RECORD NO. SP 4182, RECORD-
ING ARTIST Joe Cocker."21 A & M subsequently produced a ver-
sion of the Song performed by Joe Cocker ("the Cocker
derivative") .22
In 1978, pursuant to The Copyright Act of 1976,23 Dixon's stat-
utory heirs formally terminated Dixon's grant to Remick effective
May 3, 1982.24 On February 24, 1986, Dixon's heirs transferred
their reverted interest in the Song to Fred Ahlert, a music
publisher. 25
In 1992, Tri-Star Pictures, Inc. ("TriStar") requested Ahlert's
authorization to include the Song on the soundtrack of the motion
picture "Sleepless in Seattle."26 In June 1993, Ahlert issued a syn-
chronization license 27 granting TriStar domestic rights to the Song
for the "Sleepless in Seattle" movie soundtrack.28 The license speci-
fied one background vocal usage of the Song and five background
Licensing, 183-APR N.J. Law 10, 12 (1997). Mechanical licenses are also required
to produce and distribute movie soundtracks. See id. In addition, payment of stat-
utory royalties to copyright holders and publishers are arranged through mechani-
cal licenses. See id.
20. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 19-20.
21. See id. at 20. More specifically, the license was a "non-exclusive license to
use, in whole or in part[,] ... the copyrighted musical composition entitled BYE
BYE BLACKBIRD ... in the recording and manufacturing of phonograph records
to be manufactured and sold only in the United States," with the additional limita-
tion that the license "cover[ed] only the particular recording mentioned herein."
Ahiert, 958 F. Supp. at 171. The license also stated that it was "personal and non-
assignable." Recent Development in the Court: Mechanical License Does Not Encompass
Movie Soundtrack, 9 No. 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 30 (1997) [hereinafter Recent
Development].
22. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 20.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c) (2) 1994. When an author is deceased, his or her
spouse or children may exercise the author's termination rights. See id. For a dis-
cussion of the Act's termination provisions, see infra notes 60-67 and accompany-
ing text.
24. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 20. The Second Circuit analyzed the rights of Ahlert
and Warner as though Dixon were the sole author of the Song. See id. at 20 n.4.
Accordingly, the interests of Ray Henderson were not an issue in the lawsuit. See
id. Dixon's heirs only terminated Warner's right to use the song in the United
States; Warner retained the foreign rights to the song. See Ahlert, 958 F. Supp. at
171 n.1.
25. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 20.
26. See id.
27. See Ahlert, 958 F. Supp. at 171. A synchronization license grants a film
company authority to use a song in synchronization with an on-screen image. See
id. at 171 n.2. The synchronization license permits the actual juxtaposition of the
words and music to a video image. See Paragano, supra note 19, at 12.
28. See Ahlert, 958 F. Supp. at 171.
[Vol. 6: p. 379
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instrumental uses that were recorded specifically for the film. 29 At
the same time, Warner issued a license to TriStar granting foreign
rights for identical uses of the Song.30 When TriStar ultimately pro-
duced the soundtrack for the movie, however, the soundtrack con-
tained only an edited version of the 1969 Cocker derivative for the
background vocal.31
In July 1993, Ahlert's agent, The Harry Fox Agency, Inc.
("Fox"), issued a mechanical license to TriStar's affiliate, Sony Mu-
sic Entertainment ("Sony"), authorizing Sony to use the Cocker de-
rivative on the soundtrack album.3 2 In return, Sony agreed to pay
Ahlert a royalty fee for each phonorecord of the soundtrack album
made and distributed.33 In response, Warner notified Fox that it
was entitled to all revenues derived from uses of the Cocker deriva-
tive, particularly mechanical royalties earned from use of the Song
on the "Sleepless in Seattle" soundtrack album.3 4 As a result, Fox
canceled Ahlert's license to Sony and, in its place, issued a mechan-
ical license to Sony on Warner's behalf.33 Thereafter, Sony paid
royalties to Fox from sales of the "Sleepless in Seattle" soundtrack
album; Fox then remitted the royalties to Warner.3 6
Warner appealed a district court decision requiring it to make
royalty payments to Ahlert.37 The Second Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict court's decision that the right to authorize new uses of the
Song as embodied by the Cocker derivative reverted to Dixon's
heirs.38  The Second Circuit concluded that the license from
Warner to A & M for the limited purpose of recording the Cocker
derivative did not authorize any additional releases of the Cocker
29. See id. at 172.
30. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 20.
31. See Ahlert, 958 F. Supp. at 172.
32. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 20. The soundtrack album included the full version
of the Cocker derivative. See Recent Development, supra note 21, at 30.
33. See Ahlert, 958 F. Supp. at 172.
34. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 21.
35. See id.
36. See id. On February 8, 1996, Ahlert brought a declaratory judgment ac-
tion in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See
Ahlert, 958 F. Supp. at 170-71. On motions for summary judgment presented by
both sides, the district court ruled that all of the rights in the Cocker derivative,
other than the manufacture of phonorecords, were part of the rights that reverted
back to Dixon's heirs upon termination of the grant. See id. at 174. The court held
that, because Dixon's heirs had transferred their interest in the Song to Ahlert, he
had the right to receive the royalties for the "Sleepless in Seattle" soundtrack al-
bum. See id.
37. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 21.
38. See id. at 24.
5
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derivative that would be preserved by the Derivative Works Excep-
tion ("the Exception").39
III. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History
In 1790, the First Congress used its Article I power to enact the
first copyright law of the United States. 40 Comprehensive revisions
were enacted in 1831, 1870, and 1909. 4 1 In 1909, Congress enacted
the precursor to current copyright law, codified in Title 17 of the
United States Code. 42
Although Congress considered a number of revision measures
between 1924 and 1940, copyright law remained largely unchanged
for many years.43 Finally, following World War II, the first shift to-
ward a comprehensive reworking of the copyright structure oc-
curred when the United States assisted in the development of the
Universal Copyright Convention and became a party in 1955. 44
In the same year, Congress began efforts to substantially revise
the copyright laws to reflect the significant changes that had oc-
curred in technology since the last revision in 1909.4 5 This revision
proceeded in two phases.46 Phase one was a "non-Congressional
phase" consisting of the extensive use of outside experts and repre-
sentatives of copyright interests.47
39. See id.
40. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976). The first copyright law provided
copyright protection for an author's work for a period of fourteen years and a
renewal period of an additional fourteen years. See Lohmann, supra note 3, at 898-
99. American copyright law originated from English statutory law. See Douglas
Reid Weimer, Digital Audio Technology: Challenges to American Copyright Law, 22 ST.
MARY's L.J. 455, 459 (1990). After the American Revolution, the Continental Con-
gress encouraged the states to enact copyright legislation. See id Due to the resul-
tant lack of uniformity in the state laws, the Framers of the Constitution ultimately
decided to vest control of copyright law in the legislative branch. See id. at 460.
41. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. See id; see also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 430-31 (1984) ("From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in
response to significant changes in technology .... Repeatedly, as new develop-
ments occurred in this country, it has been the Congress that has fashioned the
new rules that new technology made necessary.").
46. See Howard B. Abrams, Who's Sony Now? Termination Rights and the Deriva-
tive Works Exception, 62 U. DET. L. REv. 182, 205-08 (1985). Abrams presents a
comprehensive outline of the legislative history leading up to passage of the 1976
Copyright Act. See id. at 205-23.
47. See id. at 206. Abrams lists "three striking characteristics" of the first phase
of the revision process: (1) the Register's near complete control over a lengthy
[Vol. 6: p. 379
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Legislative appropriations provided the Copyright Office with
funds for a comprehensive study of copyright law that established
the basis for the revision process. 48 During a three-year period, the
Office issued thirty-five monographs dealing with the substantive is-
sues hampering the revision process.4 9 In 1961, the Copyright Of-
fice issued the "Report of the Register of Copyrights on the General
Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law."50 Ultimately, this phase
culminated in the 1964 Copyright Revision Bill, the first of the
copyright revision bills leading up to the 1976 Copyright Act.5'
During this "pre-Congressional" phase, the termination provisions
and the Exception were also put into final form.52
The second phase, which included lengthy congressional hear-
ings, began only after the Copyright Office submitted the 1965
draft revision bill.55 The hearings on the bill lasted over three
weeks during a three-month period and included testimony from
more than one hundred witnesses. 54 Revision bills were submitted
process of formulating a copyright revision bill; (2) the extensive use of outside
experts and representatives of copyright interests in the initial stages of drafting
and formulating revisions to copyright law; and (3) the lack of substantive congres-
sional involvement. See id. According to Abrams, it was necessary to involve a sig-
nificant majority of copyright lawyers and scholars in the initial phase in order to
be able to pass a copyright bill "through a Congress that was largely ignorant and
uncaring about copyright issues." Id. at 207. Abrams points out that, by involving
consultants who represented the interests of the copyright industry, the Register
gained a consensus among the copyright industries on the proposed revisions and
thereby forestalled potential clashes that would have delayed the revision process.
See id. In Abrams' view, this enabled the Register to present a proposed bill to
Congress that had the approval of the majority of the copyright interests and con-
tained comparatively few unresolved issues requiring congressional input. See id. at
208.
48. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 47 (1976).
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. See Abrams, supra note 46, at 208. Abrams notes that, despite the fact that
proposed legislation was pending before Congress, the task of amending and
perfecting the legislation remained with the Register of Copyrights and his chosen
panel of advisors and experts. See id. The Register drafted the 1965 Revision Bill,
which was accompanied by his Supplemental Report containing a detailed expla-
nation of the proposed revisions. See id. at 208-09.
52. See id. at 209. According to Abrams, Congress did not give any substantive
consideration to the issues raised by the Exception. See id Consequently, in
Abrams' view, only the activities of the Register leading up to the 1965 Revision Bill
shed any light on the problems created by the Exception. See id.
53. See Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 160 (1985) (citing Hearings on
H.R 4347, 5680, 6831, 6835 Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong. (1965); Hearings on S. 1006 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks,
and Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on theJudiciary, 89th Cong. (1965-66)).
54. See id. at 160 (citing SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPY-
RIGHTS ON TiE GENERAL REVISION OF ThE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAw: 1965 REVISION BILL,
89th Cong., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION, PART 6 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1965)).
7
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to Congress in each term for the next ten years.55 Yet, when Con-
gress finally enacted the Copyright Act in 1976, the termination
provisions and the Exception were in essentially the same form as
they had originally appeared in the revision bill when it was first
proposed in 1965.56
B. Statutory Background
By passing the Copyright Act of 1976,57 Congress aimed to ful-
fill its constitutional mandate of ensuring authors the right to the
fruits of their creative efforts while simultaneously promoting pub-
lic access to their works. 58
The Act expands the rights of authors and their heirs by auto-
matically extending the life of copyrights in effect at the time of
enactment, creating a total copyright period of seventy-five years. 59
In addition, the Act contains two termination provisions, sections
203 and 304, that enable authors or their statutory beneficiaries to
terminate copyright interests previously granted to others. 60 Gener-
ally, the termination provisions apply to any "transfer of copyright
ownership," 61 nonexclusive license, 62 or any right comprised in a
copyright. 63
55. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 48-50 (1976).
56. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 160-61.
57. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1994).
58. See Lohmann, supra note 3, at 898.
59. See 17 U.S.C. §304(a) and (b) (1994). Section 304(a) applies to copy-
rights in their first twenty-eight year term as of January 1, 1978. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 304(a). Section 304(a) provides for the renewal and extension of the copyright
for an additional term of 47 years, for a total of 75 years. See id. Section 304(b)
applies to copyrights in their second renewal term prior to January 1, 1978 and
increases the copyright term by an additional 19 years, for a total of 75 years. See
17 U.S.C. § 304(b). This nineteen-year period is referred to as the "extended re-
newal term." Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 19.
60. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c) (1994). Section 203(a) covers inter-vivos
transfers executed by the author on or after January 1, 1978; the § 304 provision
applies to copyrights that were in either their first or renewal term on or before
January 1, 1978 but were transferred before January 1, 1978. See id.
61. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). A "transfer of copyright ownership" is defined
as follows: "[A] n assignment, mortgage, exclusive license, or any other conveyance,
alienation, or hypothecation of a copyright or of any of the exclusive rights com-
prised in a copyright, whether or not it is limited in time or place of effect, but not
including a nonexclusive license." Id.
62. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(a), 304(c). Nonexclusive licenses were included in
the termination provisions in order to prevent the grantee from avoiding the effect
of termination by compelling the author to grant a nonexclusive license along with
a statutorily limited transfer of exclusive rights. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 11.02 [A], at 11-11 (1994) [hereinafter NIMMER].
63. See NIMMER, supra note 62, § 11.02[A], at 11-11.
[Vol. 6: p. 379
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Section 203 serves two purposes: (1) it protects authors from
unremunerative bargains in providing for termination of an earlier
grant of rights during the first copyright period; and (2) it encour-
ages investment in derivative works by according owners of such
works a fixed period in which to realize a return on their
investment.64
In contrast, the main purpose of the section 304 provision is to
give authors or their beneficiaries the opportunity to benefit from
the extended copyright term in instances where they had already
transferred their rights.65 Congress determined that existing provi-
sions provided grantees ample opportunity to realize a return on
their investment; accordingly, it intended that the author or the
author's heirs should primarily benefit from the extended copy-
right term. 66 Under both provisions, however, only rights that were
originally the subject of the grant revert to the original copyright
owner after termination.67
In order to balance the broadness of the termination provi-
sions, Congress also incorporated the Exception in the 1976 Copy-
right Act.68  By enacting this provision, Congress effectively
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3). According to the House Report on the Act,
A provision of this sort is needed because of the unequal bargaining posi-
tion of authors, resulting in part from the impossibility of determining a
work's value until it has been exploited. Section 203 reflects a practical
compromise that will further the objectives of copyright law while recog-
nizing the problems and legitimate needs of all interests involved.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 124; see also Lohmann, supra note 3, at 909 ("Congress
explicitly sought to protect authors from early unremunerative bargains.").
65. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 140. The House Report states that "the ex-
tended term represents a completely new property right, and there are strong rea-
sons for giving the author, who is the fundamental beneficiary of copyright under
the Constitution, an opportunity to share in it." Id.
66. See Lohmann, supra note 3, at 910. In Mills Music, the Supreme Court
echoed this sentiment and stated that "the termination right was expressly in-
tended to relieve authors of the consequences of ill-advised and unremunerative
grants that had been made before the author had a fair opportunity to appreciate
the true value of his work." 469 U.S. 153, 172-73 (1985).
67. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b) (5), 304(c)(6)(E)(1994). See also NIMMER, supra
note 62, § 11.02[B], at 11-18.3 (1996) (outlining rights subject to termination).
68. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b) (1), 304(c) (6) (A). Although the Exception ap-
plies to two separate provisions of the Act, the language used to describe it in each
instance is identical. The Exception was included in both provisions of the Act "to
keep the derivative work in circulation and not to deprive the owner of the deriva-
tive work of the use of its [sic] own property." Lohmann, supra note 3, at 911
(quoting Barbara Ringer, Civil and Criminal Enforcement of the Copyright Laws: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 85-86 (1985)) [hereinafter Hearings]. The Exception was
created largely on the basis of objections made by the motion picture industry to
the termination provisions. See HowARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COiMGir
§ 12.05 [F] [5] [a], at 12-42 (1998) [hereinafter ABRAMS, THE LAW OF Coi'iu-rr].
9
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curtailed the rights provided to underlying copyright owners in the
termination provisions.69 As a result of the Exception, "[a] deriva-
tive work prepared under authority of the grant before its termina-
tion may continue to be utilized under the terms of the grant after
its termination."70
The "sole beneficiary" of the Exception is the owner of the de-
rivative work;71 the Exception protects the actual owners of deriva-
tive works from having to renegotiate their rights in the original
copyrighted work when an author terminates the grant.72
Generally, the scope of the Exception is broadly construed; it
preserves the right of the owner of a derivative work to continue to
exploit it, even if the owner acquired that right through an agree-
ment unfavorable to the original author of the work.73 This right,
however, does not extend to derivative works prepared after a grant
has been terminated.74 Consequently, courts must maintain a care-
ful balance in construing the extent of the Exception. 75 To achieve
this, courts are required to make two critical determinations. 76
First, they must discern the actual scope of the grant, and, second,
they must pinpoint the time when the derivative work was prepared
Industry members argued that they invested substantial resources in acquiring the
rights to make a motion picture based on an underlying work and also in creating
and producing a new and often "highly original" derivative work. Id. Accordingly,
industry proponents reasoned that it would be unfair to prevent them from being
able to exploit and benefit from the finished work because of an author's ability to
exercise his or her termination rights. See id.
69. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 127 ("An important limitation on the rights
of a copyright owner under a terminated grant is specified in section 203(b) (1).").
70. 17 U.S.C. §§ 203(b) (1), 304(c) (6) (A). For the statutory definition of "de-
rivative work," see supra note 8.
71. See Lohmann, supra note 3, at 911 (quoting Ringer, Hearings, supra note
68).
72. See Lohmann, supra note 3, at 913. Lohmann writes that the Exception
was necessary because "[o]therwise the author or his or her heirs might veto a
continued performance of a lawfully created derivative work prior to the termina-
tion." Id.
73. See Mills Music Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 173 (1985) ("[E]ven if a per-
son acquired the right to exploit an already prepared derivative work by means of
an unfavorable bargain with an author, that right was to be excluded from the
bundle of rights that would revert to the author when he exercised his termination
right.").
74. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(6)(A). In attempting to clarify this distinction, the
House Report draws on the example of a film made from a play and states that "a
film made from a play could continue to be licensed for performance after the motion
picture contract had been terminated but any remake fights covered by the contract
would be cut off." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 127 (1976) (emphasis added).
75. See Lohmann, supra note 3, at 898 ("Determining the scope of this excep-
tion involves balancing the competing rights of authors of underlying works
against those of proprietors of derivative works.").
76. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 174.
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because these two factors "determine which of the statute's counter-
vailing purposes should control."7
7
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Act
The phrase "terms of the grant" in the Exception is the source
of the difficulty in ascertaining who has the authority to license new
uses of a pre-termination derivative work after termination. 78 The
problem with the statutory language is that it speaks only of a single
grant, while commonly more than one grant is involved in authoriz-
ing the creation of a derivative work.79 Mills Music, Inc. v. Snydet 0 is
the seminal case that interpreted the phrase "terms of the grant."'
The crux of the Supreme Court's opinion in Mills Music turns
on its definitive construction of the phrase "under the terms of the
grant."82 This phrase in the Exception was the focus of the dispa-
77. Id.
78. See ABRAMs, THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 68, § 12.05 [F] [5] [a], at
1243 ("A drafting oversight in the language of the statute created a serious
problem.").
79. See id.
80. The Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd, 720 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Mills Music, Inc.
v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153 (1985).
81. Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 156. In Mills Music, the dispute concerned the
musical composition "Who's Sorry Now" composed in the early 1920's by Ted Sny-
der, Burt Kalmar, and Harry Ruby. See Fox, 543 F. Supp. at 847. According to
industry custom, the authors assigned their copyright to a music publisher, Water-
son, Berlin & Snyder Company. See id. at 848. In 1932, the trustee in bankruptcy
of the company assigned the copyright to Mills Music. See id. In the same year,
Mills recorded the assignment in the Copyright Office as the exclusive copyright
owner and publisher of the song for the remainder of the original term of the
copyright. See id. In 1940, the authors assigned all their renewal rights to Mills,
including the exclusive right to act as the publisher of "Who's Sorry Now." See id.
Over the years, the Harry Fox Agency, as Mills' agent, issued mechanical licenses
for "Who's Sorry Now" to producers of phonorecords and distributed royalties it
collected equally between Mills and the authors. See id.
In 1978, pursuant to § 304(c) (2) of the Copyright Act of 1976, Ted Snyder's widow
and son terminated his grant to Mills Music and claimed exclusive right to all
mechanical royalties. See Fox, 543 F. Supp. at 848. At issue was whether an au-
Lhr's termination of a Pubisher's interest also ter-minated the publisher's right to
share in the royalties generated from derivative works. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at
156. Neither party disputed the fact that Snyder's assignment of the copyright was
a grant within § 304(c) of the Act, nor did they dispute that the sound recordings
made from licenses to record companies met the statutory definition of derivative
works under the Act. See id. at 153.
82. Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 156 (stating "[t]he key that will unlock this statu-
tory puzzle is an understanding of the phrase 'under the terms of the grant' as it is
used ... in the 'derivative works exception'.....).
11
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rate district court and Second Circuit opinions in the Mills Music
case.
83
In its analysis, the Supreme Court flatly rejected the Second
Circuit's holding that Congress intended to distinguish between de-
rivative works based on a single grant and those based on successive
grants. 84 Rather, the Court held that the word "grant" appeared
three times in the one-sentence definition of the Exception, and
that it was "logical" to accord the same meaning to a word when it is
used several times in the same sentence. 85 Moreover, the Court rea-
soned that the Exception had to apply to each grant in order to
preserve all the contractual relationships that made it possible to
create the derivative works and to provide the basis for the Snyders'
right to collect derivative-works royalties. 86 The Court determined
83. See id. at 163. The district court had ruled that all of the agreements in effect
before termination governed the allocation of the royalty payments. See Fox, 543 F.
Supp. at 867-69. The Second Circuit acknowledged that the derivative works re-
sulted from two distinct grants: the original grant from Snyder to Mills and the
subsequent grants from Mills to the various record companies. In contrast to the
district court, however, the Second Circuit concluded that only the grants from
Mills to the record companies defined the circumstances under which derivative
works could be prepared. See Fox, 720 F.2d at 738-39. Accordingly, the Second
Circuit held that the Exception preserved only the second set of grants. See id. at
739. The court found that the Exception did not preserve the original grant from
the Snyders, which gave Mills a share of the mechanical royalties. See id.
Furthermore, the court determined that Mills was not a "utilizer" of a deriva-
tive work, but merely the licensor of the underlying copyright to others who cre-
ated and ultimately utilized the derivative works. Id. The court reasoned that
Mills could not rely on the Exception to protect its interests because the very pur-
pose of the Exception was to protect continued utilization of derivative works, not
continued utilization of rights attached to the underlying work. See id. In inter-
preting the legislative history of the Act, the Second Circuit also concluded that
Congress contemplated only a single grant from the copyright owner to the
grantee and not a situation where the authority to prepare derivative works arose
from successive grants. See id. at 740. The court noted that, precisely for this rea-
son, the drafters accommodated the interests of "publishers and other non-creative
middlemen" elsewhere in the Act. See id. at 743.
84. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 164.
85. See id. at 165. The Court also stated that, "[i]n construing a federal stat-
ute, it is appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that
Congress employed 'accurately expresses the legislative purpose.'" Id. at 164 (cit-
ing Park 'N Fly Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985)).
86. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 166-68. The Court stated that two significant
problems would result if the approach of the Second Circuit were followed and the
"terms of the grant" were limited to those in the individual licenses. Id. at 167.
First, the word "grant" would have inconsistent meanings not only within the defi-
nition of the Exception but within the entire termination provision of the Act. Id.
Second, if the scope of the entire set of documents that defined each licensee's
right were not used to determine the relevant "terms of the grant," Mills would not
be contractually or statutorily bound to pay royalties to the Snyders, effectively
nullifying the benefit which the termination provision was expressly designed to
confer. Id. at 166. In addressing the Second Circuit's holding that Mills was not a
"utilizer" entitled to the Exception, the Court stated that the term "utilized" could
[Vol. 6: p. 379
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that the statutory distinction between the rights that revert to the
author and those that did not depended "on the character of the
right" and not on the form or number of documents authorizing
the preparation of the derivative work.8 7 The Supreme Court con-
cluded that the "terms of the grant" in effect at the time of termina-
tion governed an author's right to receive royalties, and those terms
were therefore "excluded from the bundle of rights that the author
may seek to resell unimpeded by any ill-advised prior
commitment."88
In Woods v. Bourne Co.,89 the Second Circuit revisited the issue
of how to allocate royalty payments during the renewal period fol-
lowing termination of a publisher's interest in a song.90 In Woods,
the royalties were generated by several different post-termination
uses of a derivative work.9' In its decision, the court reasoned that
it was not necessary for publishers, rather than authors, to receive
the royalties generated by derivative works in order to keep them in
public circulation.92 The court followed the analysis in Mills Music
and held that the main goal of the Exception was to preserve "the
not be read in isolation but had to be construed within the "terms of the grant."
Id. at 168. The Court further noted that, if the Exception were read so narrowly as
to exclude Mills from its coverage, then there would be no contractual link be-
tween the Snyders and the record companies. See id. The Court held that, by
reading the statute to preserve the total contractual relationship, including Mills'
right to make authorized derivative works, the record companies would continue
to be bound to the terms of their licenses. See id. The Court concluded that con-
struing the statutory language in this manner was necessary to ensure the contin-
ued payment of royalties to Mills and therefore to the Snyders. See id. The Court
also dismissed the Second Circuit's conclusion that there was nothing in the legis-
lative history to indicate that Congress considered multi-party licensing when it
enacted the Act. See id. at 170. The Court noted that such arrangements were
typical, and that Congress was aware of them but saw no reason to draw a distinc-
tion between direct and successive grants because "the statutory purposes [were]
equally well served in either case." Id. at 172.
87. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 174.
88. Id.
89. 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
90. See id. at 985 ("The royalties generated during the extended renewal term
will be a windfall to either authors (and their heirs) or publishers .... The ques-
tion, therefore, is: Who is the beneficiary of this windfall?"). The heirs of song
composer Harr Woods claimed that they were entitled to royalties from the song
"When the Red, Red, Robin Comes Bob, Bob, Bobbin' Along" pursuant to their
termination rights under § 304(c) of the Act. See id. at 981-83. Bourne, a music
publisher, maintained that the post-termination uses of the song were derivative
works prepared prior to termination and were therefore protected by the Excep-
tion. See id. at 985.
91. See id. at 984. The uses included audiovisual works, radio performances of
sound recordings, and sales of reprints of published arrangements. See id.
92. See id. at 986.
13
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panoply of contractual obligations" governing derivative works.
93
Consequently, the court held that, if one of the grants required pay-
ment of royalties to an intermediary licensee, such as a publisher,
then continued utilization of a derivative work "under the terms of
the grant" required that the royalties should continue to be paid to
the publisher.94
In its decision, however, the court carefully distinguished those
uses that were derivative works in the pre-termination period and
those that lacked sufficient originality to be deemed derivative
works. 95 In doing so, the court analyzed the entire "panoply of con-
tractual obligations" individually to determine which uses should
benefit from the protection of the Exception. 96 Consequently, the
court held that the Exception would not apply where the post-ter-
mination use was based on a pre-termination derivative work not
protected by copyright.97
The Second Circuit's opinion in Woods established a new crite-
rion, albeit not a clear one, for determining when a derivative work
would be entitled to protection under the Exception.98 The deci-
sion, however, failed to clarify if post-termination uses of a deriva-
93. See id. at 987.
94. See Woods, 60 F.3d at 988 ("[Elven if the terms of a grant to perform any
single work may be somewhat obscured by the bulk trading of performance rights,
the terms are necessarily contained within the overarching grants... and may be
reconstructed by reference to them.").
95. See id. at 990-93.
96. See id. at 989. The court stated, "even though a sound recording is con-
cededly a derivative work, that fact alone does not justify application of the Deriva-
tive Works Exception .... We must still consider, however, whether a different
analysis requires application of the Exception." Id. The court further noted that
"[t] he same analysis applies to the royalties from the remaining post-termination
uses of the Song. . . ." Id; see also Robert C. Osterberg, The Use of Derivative Works
After Copyright Termination - Does Woods v. Bourne Expose A Quagmire?, 43 J. Copv-
RIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 28, 31 (stating that "almost the entirety of the trial was devoted
to expert testimony on the originality of the musical arrangements claimed to be
derivative works").
97. See Osterberg, supra note 96, at 31 ("[w]hat Mills did not address and the
Second Circuit did address is the effect of the post-termination copyright status of
a derivative work and the relationship between the copyright in the derivative work
and the use of the derivative work."). According to Osterberg, if the pre-termina-
tion derivative work is not protected by copyright, and the only copyright interest
that exists is in the original work, then the Exception does not apply. See id.
Therefore, Osterberg reasons, under the Woods decision, mere use of a pre-termi-
nation work is not sufficient; the publisher must show that the derivative work itself
is able to be copyrighted or included in the use of a copyrightable underlying
derivative work for the Exception to apply. See id.
98. See id. ("determining the copyright status of works used to generate post-
termination royalties will not always be easy.").
14
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tive work that had met this criterion would be encompassed by the
Exception.99
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
In Ahert, the Second Circuit confronted once again the issue
of deciding which party had the right to license new uses of a pre-
termination derivative work after termination. 100 In making its de-
termination, the court began with an analysis of the Exception it-
self.101 The court underscored the necessity for the Exception,
stating that it was fundamental in preventing both the creator and
the public at large from being "held hostage" to the "potentially
exorbitant demands" of the owner of the underlying copyright.102
The court conceded, without discussion, that the Cocker derivative
was entitled to protection as a derivative work.10 3 Consequently, in
its analysis, the court focused solely on whether inclusion of the
Cocker derivative on the movie soundtrack and soundtrack album
of "Sleepless in Seattle" was encompassed by the "terms of the
grant" to Warner.10 4 The Second Circuit turned to the Supreme
99. See id. at 32. Osterberg explains that the Second Circuit's decision makes
it difficult to distinguish between the rights of a renewal publisher and the rights
of a post-termination publisher particularly in regard to sound recordings on
movie soundtracks and soundtrack albums. See id. He maintains that the court's
opinion adds a level of complexity to the situation because "the new motion pic-
ture is a derivative work prepared after termination that utilizes a pre-termination
derivative work and the soundtrack may be a new derivative work prepared after
termination that utilizes both derivative works." Id.
100. See Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Wamer/Chappell Music, Inc., 155 F.3d
17, 23 (2d Cir. 1998) ("The Supreme Court in Mills Music did not specifically ad-
dress the question before us: whether the author or the publisher has the authority
to license new uses of a pre-termination derivative work after termination."). In
Ahlert, Dixon's heirs terminated his grant to Remick, Warner's predecessor in in-
terest, when the copyright was in its second renewal term. See id. at 20. Accord-
ingly, § 304(c) of the Copyright Act is the controlling provision in this case. See 17
U.S.C. § 304(c) (2) (1994). For a discussion of this provision of the Act, see supra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
101. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 22.
102. See id.
103. See id. ('The parties to the present case do not dispute that the Cocker
derivative is a 'derivative work prepared under authority of the grant before its
termination.'"). The court did not engage in an analysis of whether the Cocker
derivative was copyrightable as required by the Second Circuit's prior decision in
Woods. For a discussion of the court's decision in Woods, see supra notes 89-99 and
accompanying text.
104. Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 22.
15
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Court's opinion in Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder 05 for guidance in mak-
ing this determination.10 6
The Second Circuit outlined the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Mills Music and concluded that, in order to be faithful to the
Court's interpretation of the phrase "terms of the grant," it had to
enforce the "entire set of documents that created and defined each
licensee's right to prepare and distribute [the] derivative
work[ ].,,107 Consistent with this analysis, the court examined the
scope of the two sets of grants that led to the creation of the Cocker
derivative: (1) the original grant from Dixon to Remick, Warner's
predecessor in interest; and (2) the subsequent grant from Warner
to A & M that was the basis for the Cocker derivative. 10 8 The court
stated that the original grant from Dixon to Remick would have
authorized inclusion of the Cocker derivative on the movie sound-
track and soundtrack album.1 9 It ultimately determined, however,
that the second grant from Warner to A & M limited Warner's right
to use "Bye Bye Blackbird" solely for creating and releasing the
Cocker derivative as a phonorecord. n0
Accordingly, the court concluded that the right to authorize
new uses of the Song, such as the Cocker derivative, reverted to
Dixon's heirs because that right was not within the "terms of the
grant" preserved under the Exception.' The court further held
105. 469 U.S. 153 (1985). For a discussion of the Mills case, see supra notes
80-88 and accompanying text.
106. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 22.
107. Id. at 23 (quoting the Supreme Court's opinion in Mills Music, 469 U.S.
at 167) (alteration in original).
108. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 24.
109. See id.
110. See id. The court held that Warner was bound by the terms of the second
grant, which enabled Warner to receive royalties for the sale of the Cocker deriva-
tive on A & M's label but also limited exploitation of the Song exclusively to sales
of that phonorecord. See id. The district court's opinion was apparently influ-
enced by one of the defendant's experts, who wrote a book entitled Kohn on Music
Licensing. See Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 958 F.
Supp. 170, 174 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In his book, Kohn stated that inclusion of a
record number on a license limited the license to that configuration (i.e., pho-
norecord rather than CD). See id. Kohn submitted an affidavit on behalf of
Warner and attempted to distinguish this analysis from the license at issue in the
Ahlert case, but the district court did not accept the distinction. See id. Although
the Second Circuit did not address this point, it was a controlling factor in its
opinion. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 24 (holding that "Ulust as Warner continues to
benefit from the terms of the second grant... it is bound by those terms of the
second grant. .. ").
111. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 25 (implying that, by terminating Warner's copy-
right interest in Song under first grant, Dixon's heirs effectively terminated
Warner's interest in Cocker derivative under second grant for any purpose beyond
sale of phonorecords).
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that such a result was necessary to promote the policies underscor-
ing the implementation of the Exception.
1 12
B. Critical Analysis
The court's decision in Ahlert fundamentally conflicts with both
the Supreme Court's ruling in Mills Music and the Second Circuit's
opinion in Woods for several reasons.1 13 First, in denying Warner's
right to authorize new uses of the Cocker derivative and to receive
the resulting royalties, the Ahlert court drastically departed from ju-
dicial precedent. 14 Second, the court's failure to distinguish be-
tween new uses of a derivative work and new derivative works is
inconsistent with both established precedent and with the provi-
sions of the Act. 1 5 Finally, by denying Warner its right to receive
royalties from new uses of the Cocker derivative, the court
breached its duty to balance the interests of copyright holders with
those of the owners of derivative works. 116 In effect, the court failed
to carry out the legislative intent of the Act. 17
112. See id. at 24 ("[tlhis result is consistent with the purposes of the Deriva-
tive Works Exception, which seeks to protect the rights of persons who have in-
vested in creating the derivative work as well as to protect public access to
derivative works."). In its opinion, the court identified three reasons why it was
necessary to grant Ahlert rather than Warner the power to authorize new uses of
the Cocker derivative: (1) Warner's investment was already protected because it
continued to receive royalties from the sale of the A & M phonorecord; (2) a
ruling for Warner would not increase public access to the Cocker derivative be-
cause any new use would have to be specifically licensed and there was no guaran-
tee that Warner would authorize new uses more frequently than Ahlert; and (3) a
ruling for Ahlert was more consistent with the policies of § 304, which was specifi-
cally designed to allow authors or their heirs the opportunity to exploit their copy-
rights during the extended renewal term. See id. at 25.
113. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. 153 (1985); Woods, 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
For a discussion of Mills Music, see supra notes 80-88. For a discussion of Woods, see
supra notes 89-99.
114. See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text for an analysis of judicial
precedent.
115. For a discussion of the distinction between new uses of derivative works
and new derivative works, see infra notes 125-48 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 149-157 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Ahlert court's holding in light of the policy of the 1976 Copyright Act.
117. See Neil Weinstock Netanei, Copyright and a Democratic Society, 106 YALE
L.J. 283, 285 (1996). Netanel describes the purpose of copyright law as follows:
Copyright law strikes a precarious balance. To encourage authors to cre-
ate and disseminate original expression, it accords them a bundle of pro-
prietary rights in their works. But to promote public education and
creative exchange, it invites audiences and subsequent authors to use ex-
isting works in every conceivable manner that falls outside the province of
the copyright owner's exclusive rights.
Id. (emphasis added).
17
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1. Departure from Precedent
The Supreme Court in Mills Music and the Second Circuit in
Woods held that, to secure all the rights to which the owner of a
derivative work was entitled, courts must preserve the entire chain
of authority leading to the preparation of the derivative work." 8 In
Ahlert, the court acknowledged its obligation to precedent when it
held that a court must enforce the entire set of documents creating
and defining each licensee's right to prepare and distribute deriva-
tive works. 119 In determining that Ahlert was entitled to license and
receive royalties for use of the Cocker derivative, however, the effect
of the court's decision was essentially to nullify the very grant that
led to the creation of the derivative work. 120
For this reason, the holding in Ahlert directly contradicts the
Supreme Court's decision in Mills Music, as well as the Second Cir-
cuit's earlier decision in Woods. 12 In Mills, the Supreme Court held
that termination of the initial grant of rights in a multiple-grant
transaction did not abrogate the contractual rights of an intermedi-
ate licensee; consequently, an intermediate licensee was entitled to
continue collecting payments for the use of a derivative work by a
licensee who had actually prepared the derivative work.' 22 Simi-
larly, in Ahlert all of the contractual obligations in effect at termina-
tion were necessary to the creation of the Cocker derivative;
consequently, it is only logical to conclude that they remained in
effect when Warner invoked its right under the Exception to make
use of the derivative work after termination. 23 Accordingly, to be
118. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 166-68; Woods, 60 F.3d at 987.
119. See Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 155 F.3d
17, 24 (2d Cir. 1998).
120. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 166 ("[i] t is undisputed that the... grant did
not itself specify the terms that would apply to the use of any particular derivative
work.... But if the underlying grant ... had not authorized those separate
licenses, they would have been nullities."). It was the grant from Warner to A & M
that led to the recording of the Cocker derivative. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 19-20.
121. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 153; see Woods, 60 F.3d at 978. For a discussion
of Mills Music, see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
Woods, see supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
122. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 167; see also ABRAMS, THE LAw OF COPIGHrr,
supra note 68, § 12.05[F] [5], at 12-44 (noting that Supreme Court based its deci-
sion on "the concept that the series of documents running from the author to the
ultimate preparer of the derivative work should best be treated as a single transac-
tion although it was spread over several documents executed at different times").
123. See Abrams, The Law of Copyright, supra note 68, § 12.05 [F] [5], at 12-49.
Abrams writes:
[T] he Supreme Court's majority's integrating of multiple documents that
create the authority to prepare a derivative work into a single, unalterable
unit for determining what rights and duties remain in effect after termi-
nation is a logical approach that resolves the ambiguity of the word
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consistent with judicial precedent, the Ahlert court should have pre-
served all the contractual obligations leading up to the creation of
the Cocker derivative and granted Warner the royalties from the
"Sleepless in Seattle" soundtrack album. 124
2. Failure to Distinguish New Uses from New Derivative Works
The central issue in the Ahlert case was whether inclusion of the
Cocker derivative on the movie soundtrack and soundtrack album
of the movie "Sleepless in Seattle fell "under the terms of the
grant."125 In its decision, the court did not examine these uses sep-
arately, but merely held that the grant from Warner to A & M au-
thorized use of "Bye Bye Blackbird" only for the recording of the
Cocker derivative. 12 6
The Ahlert court erred, however, by ignoring the differences
between new uses of derivative works and new derivative works.
127
The court simply concluded that the right to authorize new uses of
the Cocker derivative reverted to Dixon's heirs "because that right
is not within the 'terms of the grant' preserved by the Derivative
Works Exception."' 28 The proper approach would have been for
the court to follow the analysis set forth in Woods and to determine
which of the contemplated post-termination uses would qualify for
the Exception. 129
It is difficult to reconcile the facts of Ahlert with the court's
holding that, "[a] lthough the original grant would presumably au-
thorize this new use, plainly Warner's license to A & M does not.'
15 0
The 1976 Copyright Act clearly provides a basis for distinguishing
'grant' in the statutory language in a rational manner and clearly defines
all the rights that remain after termination is effected.
Id.
124. See id. § 12.05[F] [5], at 12-45. Abrams also states that an "expansive
reading of the term 'grant' is the 'cornerstone' of the majority's decision" in Mills
Music. Id.
125. Ahert, 155 F.3d at 22 ("[The parties] dispute whether the inclusion of
the Cocker derivative on the soundtrack and soundtrack album constitutes
'utiliz[ation] under the terms of the grant.'"). (second alteration in original).
126. See id. at 24.
127. See id. at 22 n.7. ("The parties also dispute wleteLIL OF 11 soutrot ackA
and the soundtrack album represent new derivative works prepared after termina-
tion. . . . In light of our disposition of this case, we need not resolve this
question.").
128. Id. at 25.
129. See Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 989 (2d Cir. 1995). For a discus-
sion of the Second Circuit's decision in Woods v. Bourne, see supra notes 89-99 and
accompanying text.
130. Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 24.
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between movie soundtracks and soundtrack albums.131 The House
Report on the Act states that "sound tracks of motion pictures...
are specifically included in the definition of 'motion pictures,' and
excluded in the definition of 'sound recordings."1 3 2 Accordingly,
the AhIert court properly held that the use of the Cocker derivative
on the movie soundtrack would not be entitled to protection under
the Exception because it falls outside the "terms of the grant."133
The "terms of the grant" would, however, encompass use of the
Cocker derivative on the soundtrack album.'3 4 By assigning their
interest in the Song, the authors granted Remick, Warner's prede-
cessor in interest, the right to prepare derivative works.135 Conse-
quently, A & M's production of the Cocker derivative could be
viewed as the means by which Warner chose to exercise its right to
prepare a derivative work. 136 Therefore, the post-termination li-
cense authorizing use of the Cocker derivative on the soundtrack
album simply constitutes the further utilization of a previously pre-
pared derivative work.137 This conclusion is supported by the fact
that the Cocker derivative is but one of a series of songs originating
from various musicians and compiled for use on the "Sleepless in
Seattle" soundtrack album. 138
Additionally, the Supreme Court has implicitly indicated that it
is the publisher who has the authority to license new uses of deriva-
131. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). The statute defines "sound recordings" as
"works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds,
but not including the sounds accompanying a motion picture or other audiovisual work,
regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as disks, tapes, or other pho-
norecords, in which they are embodied." Id. (emphasis added).
132. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 56 (1976).
133. Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 24.
134. See NIMMER, supra note 62, § 11.02[C] [1], at 11-18.10 ("Assuming that
the recording.., is unchanged from the form in which it was originally licensed,
this usage therefore should not be barred as a new derivative use.").
135. See ABRAMs, THE LAW OF COPMYIGHT, supra note 68, § 12.05[F] [5], at 12-
44 n.191.
136. See id.
137. See NIMMER, supra note 62, § 11.02[C] [1], at 11-18.10. Nimmer specifi-
cally addresses the issue of sound recordings and states that "[pilacing the sound
recording in a new album.., constitutes the preparation of a new compilation, but
it does not constitute the preparation of a new derivative work." Id. (emphasis added).
138. See id. Nimmer analyzes the very problem under consideration in Ahlert.
See id. He makes a comparison between sound recordings used in a new "greatest
hits" album after termination and an old sound recording used in a new motion
picture that is incorporated into a soundtrack album. See id. Nimmer concludes
that "[i]t would be bizarre to allow the usage in a 'greatest hits' album, given its
status as a compilation, and simultaneously to deny its usage in a 'soundtrack al-
bum,' which is also a compilation. For one and the same old recording is com-
piled into each." Id. at § 11.02[C] [1], at 11-18.10 n.76.4.
[Vol. 6: p. 379
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tive works.139 In Mills Music, the district court determined that the
publisher retained the authority to license new uses of derivative
works first licensed prior to termination, provided the new uses did
not constitute new derivative works. 140 In its holding in Mills Music,
the Supreme Court did not overrule the district court's decision on
this issue.14'
The Ahlert court, however, specifically rejected the district
court's reasoning in Mills Music.142 It claimed that, if the holding
were adhered to, only the terms of the original grant from the au-
thor to the music publisher would be enforced while the terms of
the subsequent grant from the music publisher to the record com-
pany would be ignored.143 The court in Ahlert held that, to be con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's ultimate holding in Mills Music,
the entire pre-termination transaction leading up to Cocker deriva-
tive had to be preserved, including any limitations. 144 The court
concluded that this necessarily restricted Warner's right to author-
ize post-termination uses of the derivative work.145 Yet, as the
Supreme Court in Mills Music made clear, the entire set of docu-
ments that created and defined a derivative work must be analyzed
together to determine the "terms of the grant."1 46 Accordingly,
139. SeeAbrams, The Law of Copyright, supra note 68, § 12.05[F] [5], at 12-52.
140. See The Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844, 868
(S.D.N.Y. 1982). The district court dismissed the Snyders' argument that Mills'
subsequent licenses were limited to the single use identified and authorized under
each license, thereby limiting Mills' right to license a new use of an old derivative
work. See id. The court held that it was "illogical" to impose on Mills a limitation
on use that Mills had imposed solely on its own licensees. See id. The court found
that, under this reasoning, Mills would be constrained by a contractual self-im-
posed limitation that bore no relationship to Ted Snyder's original grant to Mills.
See id. The court concluded that the Snyders' argument had to be rejected be-
cause employing it would abrogate Mills' right to license re-releases of old sound
recordings contemplated in the original grant. See id.
141. SeeAbrams, The Law of Copyright, supra note 68, § 12.05[F] [5], at 12-52.
According to Abrams, because the Supreme Court in Mills Music did not even con-
sider the particular issue of post-termination licensing of pre-termination deriva-
tive works when it reversed the Second Circuit decision, the district court's opinion
must be given some precedential value. See id.
142. See Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 155 F.3d
17, 24 (2d Cir. 1998) ("We are not persuaded by the district court's reasoning inHaM . FoJ , ,,.,"
143. See id.
144. See id. (quoting Howard B. Abrams, Who's Sony Now? Termination Rights
and the Derivative Works Exception, 62 U. DET. L. REv. 182, 235 (1985)).
145. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 24 (stating that license from Warner to A & M "is a
narrow one granting A & M the right to use 'Bye Bye Blackbird' for the limited
purpose of recording the Cocker derivative and releasing it as 'Record No. SP
4182.'").
146. Mills Music Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 167 (1985).
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both the original grant from Dixon to Remick and the subsequent
grant from Warner to A & M have to be considered as a whole in
judging the uses for which a derivative work can be employed.' 47
And, as the Ahlert court itself conceded, the original grant from
Dixon would authorize inclusion of the Cocker derivative on the
"Sleepless in Seattle" soundtrack album. 148
3. Implementing the Policies of the 1976 Copyright Act: Balancing
Competing Rights to Derivative Works
A more basic problem with the Ahlert decision is that it is incon-
sistent with the policies of the 1976 Copyright Act and, in particu-
lar, the Exception. As the Supreme Court noted in Mills Music,
"It]he purpose of the Exception was to 'preserve the right of the
owner of a derivative work to exploit it, notwithstanding the rever-
sion.'"" 49 The Court further held that, in preserving this right,
there was no discernable distinction between those who actually
prepared derivative works and those intermediaries who granted
licenses leading to their creation. 150
Congress included the Exception in the Act to allay publishers'
concerns that the termination provisions would divest them of their
interest in a copyrighted work. 151 As discussed above, the Act was
the result of a series of negotiated compromises among various in-
terest groups to which Congress gave its stamp of approval.' 52 By
giving these compromises effect in their decisions, courts do no
more than implement Congress' will.153 Accordingly, in order to
147. See id. (finding "the scope of the entire set of documents that created
and defined each licensee's right to prepare and distribute derivative works is used
to define the relevant 'terms of the grant' for purposes of the Exception").
148. See Ahlert, 155 F.3d at 24 (stating that "the original grant [from Dixon to
Warner's predecessor in interest] would presumably authorize this new use").
149. Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 173 (quoting Barbara Ringer, FURTHER Discus-
SIONS AND COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFr FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW,
88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 4 (H. Judiciary Comm. Print 1964)).
150. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 175-76; see also ABRAMS, THE LAw OF CoPy-
RIGHT, supra note 68, § 12.05[F] [5], at 12-47 to 1248.
151. See Litman, supra note 5, at 893 ("Indeed, the vehemence of publishers'
opposition to reversion, even when modified by the derivative works exception,
indicates that they envisioned that reversion or termination would divest publish-
ers and other intermediaries of any interest whatsoever in the copyrighted work.").
152. See id. at 903 ("Members of Congress revised the copyright law by encour-
aging negotiations between interests affected by copyright, by trusting those nego-
tiations to produce substantive compromises, and by ultimately enacting those
compromises into law."). For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history
of the Act, see supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
153. See Litman, supra note 5, at 894 ("If courts were to interpret the statute
by determining whether they could give those compromises effect, they would nec-
[Vol. 6: p. 379
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give effect to Congress' intent, the Second Circuit should have
granted Warner, not Ahlert, the right to license and receive royal-
ties for post-termination use of the Cocker derivative on the "Sleep-
less in Seattle" soundtrack album.154 Instead, by denying Warner
the right to receive royalties, the court divested Warner of any right
in the Cocker derivative and overturned the basic premise of the
Exception.1 55 This result seems particularly unjust in view of the
fact that it was Warner's grant to A & M that led to the creation of
the derivative work. 156
Moreover, if the Second Circuit's opinion is adhered to, then a
grantee would have to include in each of its subsequent licenses
every conceivable use of a contemplated derivative work or risk los-
ing the royalties generated from such works when an initial grant
was terminated. Such a requirement is totally at odds with the Ex-
ception, which was designed specifically to preserve the rights of
derivative works owners and to ensure continued utilization of a
pretermination derivative work after termination.157
V. IMPACr
The courts decided Mills Music and Woods without resolving the
issue of post-termination licensing of new uses of derivative works
prepared prior to termination.158 With Ahiert, the Second Circuit
had the opportunity to clarify an ambiguous area of the law. In-
stead, the court's decision only further confuses an already mud-
dled area of copyright law because it goes against the weight of
established precedent and conflicts with the policies of the 1976
Copyright Act.159
essarily need to consider what the parties to the compromises believed their agree-
ments meant. The resulting construction would... work Congress' will.").
154. See Fred Ahlert Music Corp. v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 155 F.3d
17, 25 (2d Cir. 1998).
155. See Litman, supra note 5, at 892-93 ("The parties also included in their
compromise the Register's proposal to permit the proprietor of a derivative work
to continue exploiting it after termination of the grant.").
156. See Ahiert, 155 F.3d at 19-20.
157. See Mills Music Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 173 (1985) ("Pre-termina-
Gun dciivaLive wolks - tlose prepared under the authority of thc terminated
grant - may continue to be utilized under the terms of the terminated grant.").
For a comprehensive discussion of the Exception, see supra notes 68-77 and accom-
panying text.
158. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. 153 (1985); Woods, 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
For a discussion of Mills Music, see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of Woods, see supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text.
159. For a comprehensive discussion of the legislative history of the Act, see
supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
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When it decided Mills Music, the Supreme Court's goal was to
strike a balance between the two competing interests established by
the 1976 Copyright Act: (1) the ability of authors or their heirs to
regain rights that may have been improvidently given away; and (2)
the right of the owner of a derivative work to continue to exploit
the derivative work after termination. 160 There is a natural tension
between two such divergent interests. 161 As the Supreme Court
stated in Mills Music, the termination provisions and the Exception
are "countervailing purposes" of the statute. 162
The termination provisions were intended to "produce an ac-
commodation and a balancing among various interests."1 63 Cer-
tainly, the main purpose of the termination provisions was to
protect the interests of authors and their heirs and to maximize
their ability to exploit the value of their works during the renewal
term. 164 Neither the Act itself nor its legislative history, however,
indicate that this was to be accomplished at the expense of the legit-
imate rights of others to continue to utilize their derivative works
after termination.1 6 5
The Second Circuit's decision in Ahlert provides no clear gui-
dance for determining parties' rights under the Act because it runs
counter to Congressional policy as well as judicial precedent. Pre-
sumably, as more authors or their heirs exercise their termination
rights, there will be additional opportunities for the courts to inter-
160. See ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT, supra note 68, § 12.05[F][5],at 12-
47.
161. See Donald A. Hughes, Jr., Jurisprudential Vertigo: The Supreme Court's View
of "Rear Window" is for the Birds, 60 Miss. LJ. 239, 250 (1990). In explaining the
cause of this tension, Hughes states:
The power to make a derivative work is one of the expressly enumerated
rights granted to a copyright owner in § 106. But once the owner of the
underlying copyright has acquiesced to the making of a derivative work
and the derivative work has in fact been made, the derivative work is
outside the sphere of control of the underlying copyright holder.
Id. at 251.
162. See Mills Music, 469 U.S. at 174.
163. Id. at 174 n.41.
164. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 124 (1976).
165. See Hughes, supra note 161, at 239 ("The termination provisions of the
1976 Copyright Act and their legislative history are unambiguous with regard to
the continued use of derivative works after the termination of the prior grants
which created them."). Hughes writes:
The derivative work is a work in its own right, albeit one based on a pre-
existing work. It is not analogous to a license to reproduce the underly-
ing work for a particular period of time which is void when the period
expires. One cannot go back in time and undo the derivative work; for
good or ill it has been created, frequently on a scale and at a cost which
dwarf the underlying work.
Id. at 252.
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pret this complex area of copyright law. Clarity will not be restored
to copyright jurisprudence until the judiciary reaffirms, in carefully
considered decisions, its primary task of maintaining the delicate
balance Congress sought to achieve when it implemented the Copy-
right Act of 1976.166
Eileen Siegeltuch
166. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431-32
(1984) ("The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly ... re-
flects a balance of competing claims.... The immediate effect of our copyright
law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim
is... to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.").
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